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How Precarious Employment 
Affects Health and Safety at Work: 
The Case of Temporary Agency 
Workers 
Elsa Underhill and Michael Quinlan 
397 
International studies indicate temporary agency workers are more likely to 
be injured at work than other types of employees. However explanations for 
this have been less forthcoming. This paper seeks to begin filling this gap. 
A study was undertaken in Victoria, Australia, of occupational health and 
safety (OHS) amongst temporary agency workers drawing upon workers' 
compensation claim files for injured agency and directly hired workers from 
1995-2001, and focus groups of temporary agency workers conducted in 2003. 
In analyzing the results, use was made of risk factors identified in a model 
that has been developed to explain how precarious employment affects OHS 
-the pressure, disorganization and regulatory failure (PDR) model (Quinlan 
and Bohle, 2004, 2009). Drawing principally on qualitative data, the paper 
finds that whilst agency workers share common risk factors with other forms 
of precarious workers, unique characteristics associated with the triangular 
nature of agency employment heighten their vulnerability further. 
KEYWORDS: precarious employment, temporary agency work, occupational 
health and safety 
Introduction 
Work organization and labour markets have experienced significant change in 
virtually all advanced industrial economies in recent decades. Important amongst 
these has been the rapid expansion of temporary agency work (also known as 
labour hire or leased workers). The number of agency workers more than doubled 
during the 1990s in most European Union (EU) member states. the United 
States of America (USA), and Australia (Storrie, 2002; Houseman, Kalleberg and 
Erickcek, 2003; Laplagne, Glover and Fry, 2005). By 2001, agency employment 
had stabil ized at just under two per cent of the EU workforce (Arrowsmith, 2006) 
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before more divergent patterns emerged. It has since grown steeply in some 
countries (such as Canada, Germany and several Northern and Eastern European 
countries), slowed in others (such as France), and fallen in yet others, such as the 
United Kingdom (Biggs, 2006; Arrowsmith, 2009; Vosko, 201 0). In Australia, 
temporary agency workers' share of the workforce peaked at around five percent 
in the mid-2000s before falling quickly to around 2.5% in late 2008 when, with 
the onset of the global financial crisis, agency workers were amongst the f irst to 
lose their jobs (Louie et al., 2006; ABS, 2008; Skilled Group, 2009). Occupying 
only a small percentage of the workforce, national statistics belie the importance 
of agency employment. In most developed economies, agency workers are 
disproportionately employed in low skilled and often hazardous occupations and 
industries, and their employment creates downward pressures on wages and 
employment conditions, safety, and union membershi p (OECD, 2002; Davidov, 
2004; Arrowsmith, 2006; Underhill and Rimmer, 2009). 
Since the 1990s researchers have been examining how changes in work 
organization have affected OHS, with most studies finding that job insecurity 
and precarious employment is associated with significantly worse OHS outcomes 
(Quinlan, Mayhew and Bohle, 2001; Quinlan and Bohle, 2009). Studies of temporary 
agency workers' OHS outcomes have produced similar results. In France, the US, 
Spain and Australia, agency workers have been found to experience a greater OHS 
risk than traditional, direct hire workers (see Silverstein, Viikari-Juntura and Kalat, 
2002; Underhill, 2002; Smith et al, 2010); most studies of injury severity agree 
they are injured more severely (Silverstein and Foley, 1998; Underhill, 2002; for an 
exception see Garda-Serrano, Hernanz and Toharia, 201 0). Explanations for their 
greater vulnerability, however, have been constrained by the relatively small size of 
the temporary agency workforce and the difficulties researchers face in accessing 
such workers. Furthermore, survey analyses often group agency workers with 
other subsets of precarious employees, such as seasonal and on-call employees, 
limiting the identification of factors peculiar to agency work (Virtanen et al, 2005; 
for example, Aronsson, 1999; Lewchuk, Clarke and de Wolff, 2008). 
Those studies which have distinguished temporary agency work from other 
employment types have generally identified similar risk factors. These include 
poorer supervision (Rebitzer, 1995); inadequate training and experience (Fran<;ois 
and Lievin, 1995; Rebitzer, 1995; Paoli and Merllie, 2001); a younger workforce 
with fewer qualifications (Fran<;ois and Lievin, 1995; Underhill, 2008); exposure 
to higher risk tasks (Fran<;ois and Lievin, 1995; Paoli and Merllie, 2001; lacuone, 
2006; Louie et a!., 2006); lack of workplace voice; and pervasive regulatory 
failure (Johnstone and Quinlan, 2006; Vosko, 2010). Some characteristics (such 
as younger age distribution and lack of voice) are shared with other precarious 
workers (see for example Aronsson, 1999; Benavides eta!, 2006; Lewchuk, 
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Clarke and de Wolff, 2008; Keegel, 2009). Others, however, appear unique to 
the agency work context and may contribute to the heightened risk of injury 
experienced by agency workers. 
Following successive reviews of studies in this field, Quinlan and Bohle (2004, 
2009) developed the 'Pressures, Disorganization and Regulatory Failure' (PDR) 
model to explain how precarious employment in its broadest sense affected OHS. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the applicability of the PDR model in the 
narrower context of temporary agency work. In this research, we draw upon 
data from a sample of injured temporary agency and directly hired workers and 
from focus groups of agency workers (most of whom had not been injured) to 
explore the relationship between the nature of temporary agency operations, 
the pressures experienced by temporary agency workers, and their higher risk of 
workplace injury. 
This paper is divided into four further sections. Fi rst the PDR model is briefly 
explained. The following section details the methods used. Evidence for each dimen-
sion of the model is then examined, followed by a discussion and conclusion. 
The PDR Model: How Precarious Employment Affects OHS 
Quinlan and Bohle's PDR model groups factors explaining poorer OHS outcomes 
amongst precarious workers into three categories: economic and reward pres-
sures; disorganization at the workplace; and regulatory failure. The f irst en-
compasses sources of income insecurity which influence safe work practices. 
Employment and income insecurity, and intense competition for work can con-
tribute to a range of hazardous practices including work intensification, cut-
ting-corners, accepting hazardous tasks, working when injured, and multiple 
job holding (Quinlan and Bohle, 2004). This factor might seem to overlap with 
Siegrist's (1996) notion of effort/reward imbalance and Lewchuk, Clarke and de 
Wolff's (2008) notion of employment strain, but it also includes the pressures 
arising from dependency and job insecurity (in subcontracting or agency labour 
arrangements). 
The second factor, disorganization, concerns characteristics of organizations 
lacking commitment to a stable workforce. Where workforce instability prevents 
the sustaining of established rules, procedures and roles, then OHS knowledge and 
management systems become fractured, whilst inter-worker communication, task 
co-ordination, and lines of management control are weakened. Underqualified, 
under-trained and inexperienced workers become more commonplace. In this 
setting, contingent workers are less able to collectively organize or be heard 
at the workplace. Disorganization is not simply a result of employer oversight, 
it is "a characteristic feature of the relationship between contingent workers 
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and their employers. Use of temporary workers affects employer attitudes to 
induction, training, participation in workplace committees, and other activities 
with implications for safety" (Quinlan and Bohle, 2004: 93). 
The third factor, an increased likelihood of regulatory failure, refers to the 
extent to which OHS and employment regulation is weakened by precarious 
employment arrangements. Gaps in employment protection and minimum 
entitlements emerge; compliance is weakened as employee awareness of 
entitlements declines or is undermined by their labour market vulnerability; and 
enforcement processes encounter hurdles such as identifying those with legal 
responsibility in multiemployer worksites. Inconsistencies or discriminatory aspects 
in both the form and implementation of regulation practices bear most heavily on 
those in precarious employment (including foreign and undocumented workers, 
Sargeant and Tucker, 2009). Table 1 summaries the key risk factors associated 
with each of the three components of the PDR model. 
TABLE 1 
Risk Factors Associated with the PDR Model 
Economic and Reward Pressures Disorganization Regulatory Failure 
Insecure jobs (fear of losing job) Short tenure, inexperience Poor knowledge of legal rights, 
obligations 
Contingent, irregular payment Poor induction, training Umited access to OHS, workers' 
and supervision compensation rights 
long or irregular work hours Ineffective procedures Fractured or disputed legal 
and communication obligations 
Multiple jobholding Ineffective OHSMS I Non-compliance and regulatory 
inability to organize oversight (stretched resources) 
The model includes risk factors which may be considered worker-related, such 
as inexperience, multiple-job holding and poor knowledge of legal rights, as well as 
factors stemming from the employer. However, the former, as will be demonstrated 
below, are also linked to employer practices. These characteristics are not unique 
to precarious workers, but are experienced more acutely by them. The PDR model 
does not identify specific outcomes associated with particular risk factors; it 
proposes that existing risks will be exacerbated and new risks will emerge because 
of the factors identified in Table 1 above. This model has been applied in a number 
of empirical studies (McNamara, 2009; Bohle eta/., 2011 ), with refinements arising 
from its application to new empirical data sets. In the following section, the research 
methods for this application of the risk factors of the PDR model will be described. 
Ongoing research on the model seeks to identify the interconnections between the 
three broad categories of risk. Our study is restricted to assessing the value of these 
risk factors rather than the ways these interact. 
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Methodology 
Researching temporary agency workers is difficult. They are physically dispersed, 
poorly unionized, often itinerant, and reluctant to disclose information for fear of 
job loss (Quinlan, Mayhew and Bohle, 2001; Lipscomb et at., 2008). To overcome 
these constraints, two methods were used to gather data about their employ-
ment. The first involved examining individual worker's compensation files; the 
second used focus groups of temporary agency workers and the union officials 
who organized them. 
In Victoria, all employees with a work-related injury (including independent 
contractors deemed workers) are entitled to wage compensation and the 
reimbursement of medical expenses. WorkSafe Victoria (WorkSafe), the 
government agency responsible for workers' compensation, sets employer 
premium rates, maintains data on all injured workers who lodge a claim, and 
compensates claimants. It contracts the management of claims, however, to 
insurance companies from whom employers purchase workers' compensation 
insurance. When an injured worker lodges a claim with their employer, the 
employer's insurance company can choose to investigate whether the injury 
meets the statutory requirement of being work-related and therefore whether 
the claim will be conceded. They may do so at the request of employers (not all 
such requests are accepted) or on their own volition. They also invest igate claims 
involving occupational stress, severe injuries which may result in a common law 
negligence suit, and when the insurance agent or employer suspect the claimant 
is malingering. Employers have a financial incentive to challenge the legitimacy 
of claims because even though the system is no-fault based, their insurance 
premiums are partial ly experience-rated. For temporary agency workers, thei r 
employer's premium, not the host's, will be so affected by compensation claims. 
Once a worker's compensation entitlement ceases, or the claim has been rejected, 
the files are archived with WorkSafe. 
A sample of injured agency and regular, direct hire workers was taken from 
these closed investigated compensation claim files. These files provided a rich 
source of information about the nature of placements and the circumstances 
surrounding agency workers' injuries. They typically contained a summary of the 
injured worker's employment history, witness statements, correspondence with 
the claimant, and medical reports. As investigations are conducted shortly after 
the alleged injury has occurred, the circumstances of the injury are fresh in the 
parties' memories, enhancing reliability. But the files also contained limitations. 
Claims involving acute injuries (such as fractures and amputations) concern 
obvious harm and were less likely to be investigated. They are underrepresented. 
Also, investigations mostly explored whether the claimant was entitled to 
compensation and did not analyse factors affecting injury causation. Gaps 
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in data thus occur, particularly in relation to contextual information about 
union membership, consultative processes, and whether training or adequate 
supervision was received prior to the injury occurring. 
Approval was granted by WorkSafe to examine a random sample of 198 
investigated temporary agency workers' compensation claims lodged between 
1995 (the year in which their data base first identified temporary agency 
workers) and 2001. The sample was stratified by those occupational groups with 
the largest number of agency worker claims. The time period was limited to 
six years to keep data collection manageable and avoid recent sensitive claims. 
A contrasting sample of direct hire claimants was also taken, matched at the 
narrowest occupational level (such as forklift driver or warehouse packer) and 
year of claim to enable comparisons of injury experience while minimizing 
occupational and temporal effects. As the files contained private information 
an agreement was undertaken with WorkSafe that analysis would not identify 
claimants, and documents would stay within WorkSafe's offices. Ethics approval 
was received from the University of New South Wales. 
Data coding was informed by the literature on precarious workers and 
OHS, and the broader OHS literature which flags variables such as shift work, 
working hours, and OHS management systems. Quantifiable data (such as the 
receipt of training) was coded into a database, and combined with WorkSafe's 
administrative workers' compensation data for statistical analysis. Qualitative 
data about factors such as perceptions of the quality of training, the causes of 
injuries, and injured workers' accounts of their employment experience, were 
recorded for micro case study analysis. In the data analysis phase, quantifiable 
data were f irst tested for statistically significant differences between injured 
agency and direct hire workers using SPSS 13.0 (chi-square tests, p < 0.05). Those 
variables revealed to be statistically significant were retained and explored further 
through qualitative analysis. Factors excluded through this process included non-
Anglophone background, gender, shift work, provision of personal protective 
equipment, performing heavy arduous lifting, and highly repetitive tasks. The 
latter two variables were only significant at p < 0.1 0. While common themes 
were identified and analyzed using qualitative data, the restriction on copying 
files verbatim precluded analysis using content analysis software. 
Table 2 gives the occupation and industry distribution of the sample. Over 
85% were located in blue collar occupations, and half were performing low 
skilled jobs. 
The second data source came f rom focus groups of agency workers and 
union officials who represented agency workers. Support for the focus groups 
was gained f rom the peak union body which promoted the research amongst 
their members. Five focus groups were held in late 2003 in metropolitan and 
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TABLE 2 
Occupation / Industry Classification of Worker's Compensation Claimants' Sample 
Occupation /Industry Temporary Agency Workers Direct Hire Workers 
No. 
White collar, miscellaneous industries 28 
Maintenance trades, primarily manufacturing industry' 27 
Building industry trade and non-trade• 42 
Stores, warehouse workers and truck drivers 54 
Machinists. process workers, manufacturing industry 47 
Total 198 
• indudes a small number of electricity generation maintenance workers 
' includes a small number of mining and agricultural workers 
% No. % 
14.1 28 14.1 
13.6 30 15.2 
21.2 39 19.7 
27.3 52 26.3 
23.7 49 24.7 
100 100 100 
403 
regional Victoria. Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes. Of the 38 
participants, 29 were employed as agency workers and nine were union officials. 
After collecting biographic information, the discussions explored participants' 
experience of working through a temporary employment agency, including 
the process of obtaining host placements, benefits experienced from working 
through an agency, the nature of workplace consultation and communication, 
union representation, t raining, safety, and return to work post-injury. 
Focus group participants worked in non-unionized call centres, and unionized 
construction, local government, manufacturing, meat processing and warehouse 
distribution. Union values meant participants were more likely to be critical of 
agency work. They were also typically placed in unionized host workplaces, and 
likely to enjoy better employment conditions than other non-unionized agency 
workers. Proceedings were recorded for transcription, and common themes 
were identified. As only five groups were held, content analysis software was 
not considered necessary. In the following analysis, we draw only upon that 
data which develops our understanding of factors which contribute to agency 
workers' heightened risk of injury. 
The PDR Model and the Experience of Temporary 
Agency Workers 
In this section, the PDR model is used as a f ramework to introduce the research 
data described above to analyze the experience of agency workers and explain 
their greater propensity to be injured at work. The risk factors identified in the 
model are each addressed, drawing upon data from the workers' compensation 
f iles (hereafter 'injured workers') and from focus groups. 
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Economic and Reward Pressures 
The first of the PDR factors, economic and reward pressures, includes insecure 
employment, contingent wages, long or irregular hours, and multiple job hold-
ings. The workers' compensation claims data suggests agency workers were 
more prone to these job characteristics than direct hire workers. Of the injured 
workers, 84% of agency workers were hired on an hourly paid casual basis, with-
out protection from arbitrary dismissal compared with only 15% of injured direct 
hire workers. Agency workers had shorter employment tenure, with only 29% 
employed for more than one year with their current employer compared to 78% 
of direct hire workers. Their working hours were also more irregular. Twenty-
seven percent (27%) of agency workers worked irregular hours compared to 
only 9% of direct hire workers (all casuals) For the agency hire casuals, with 
wages contingent upon placements, irregular hours produced irregular income. 
An injured agency storeperson, for example, earned an average of AUD$276 per 
week over 15 weeks, but his weekly wage varied from a low AUD$1 OS through 
to AUD$621. The last of the economic and reward factors, multiple job holding, 
was not commonly reported in the claims files, with only 6% of agency and 3% 
of direct hire claimants (all casuals) reporting such. With the exception of multiple 
job holding, each of the risk factors identified as economic and reward pres-
sures were evidenced amongst injured agency workers. Whilst these factors have 
been identified by Quinlan and Bohle (2004) as common to precarious workers in 
general, they were more pronounced amongst the injured agency workers than 
casual direct hire workers in this sample. 
The workers' compensation files revealed several ways in which these factors 
enhanced agency workers' risk of injury and injury severity. First, agency workers' 
belief that they could easily be replaced by another agency worker heightened 
their fear of job loss, creating reluctance to report minor injuries. They worked 
with injuries, often until physically unable to continue. The pressure to attend 
whilst injured was compounded by lack of entitlement to sick pay which might 
otherwise have allowed them paid t ime off to recuperate. The account of a 
process worker with tendonitis typified this process: 
I kept working and put up with the pain ... I didn't mention it to anyone at the time as 
I was concerned my job would be terminated. I mentioned it in passing to a couple of 
employees ... that I may have to wear a wrist and knee brace. I needed the money and 
didn't want to attract attention by wearing a brace. 
Quantifying this reluctance was problematic as claims investigators did not 
routinely ask injured workers whether job insecurity contributed to a delay in 
claims lodgement. Nonetheless, 7% of agency claimants compared to only 
1% of direct hire claimants raised the issue in conversation with investigators. 
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An injured welder's comments, from the claims f iles, suggested typical agency 
workers' fears: 
I did not seek immediate medical treatment, which in hindsight I believe I should have. 
I know what it is like in this industry and I did not want to get a bad name. You know 
how word gets around .. . 
Duration of placement did not necessarily lessen the risk of job loss. A process 
worker, for example, injured his knee six months into a placement yet was 
advised he would be replaced by another agency worker if he took two days 
off to rest. Consequently, he worked until no longer physically able to do so. 
After two months recovery time, he was certified medically fit to return to work 
on modified duties but was not offered another placement. Another claimant 
worked single handed after injuring the other hand, notwithstanding being 
13 months into a placement. In contrast, only two injured direct hire workers' 
compensation claimants expressed a wil lingness to work when injured, and both 
were motivated by loss of overtime earnings, not fear of job loss. Agency workers' 
fears of job loss were well founded. Almost half (46%) the injured casual agency 
workers were offered no further placements after lodging workers' compensation 
claims, compared to only 14% of direct hired casual workers. Permanent agency 
workers fared better. Only 16% were dismissed after lodging a claim compared 
to 1 0% of permanent direct hire workers. 
Focus group participants spoke of the uncertainty associated with continually 
changing host locations, not knowing when or where the next placement would 
be, or why they were moved with little notice. Comments such as "living by the 
mobile phone", "anybody can be moved or replaced at any time", "you refuse to 
work overtime, and all the bastards do is get somebody else in and you are gone" 
were commonplace. Some had regular hosts yet still irregular hours (such as call 
centres, warehousing and local councils), whilst others churned through hosts 
and registered with multiple agencies to ensure continuity of income (such as in 
construction, manufacturing and nursing). They understood well the increased 
exposure to risk which employment insecurity carried, even though few reported 
being injured at work. According to participants, agency workers who raised OHS 
issues with their employer or host were allegedly dismissed, and the perception 
that "safety concerns are ignored" was widespread. 
Second, the PDR model highlights the relationship between economic insecurity 
and work intensif ication. This was supported by evidence which showed how the 
precarious economic position of agency workers led them to accept understaffing, 
task overload and the work pace achieved by more experienced permanent 
workers. In one workers' compensation case an electrical linesman injured his 
knee whilst pulling a heavy cable. According to the claims investigator: 
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Ideally, two persons should be involved in this procedure, however due to the system 
in place at [the agency), that is not always possible ... on many occasions, the pulling 
of [the] cable is carried out alone ... there may be some form of negligence against [the 
agency] for not providing sufficient manpower to alleviate the risk of injury. 
In another workers' compensation case, a worker was required to construct 
one wooden pallet every 30 seconds, lifting 630 bearers weighing five kilograms 
each, per day. He was injured within two days of commencing the placement. 
The claim investigator summed up the worker's experience as "he had a bit of 
trouble keeping up with his co-worker who was a big bloke who had obviously 
more technique having been involved in the job for much longer ... there was 
potential for him to suffer an injury as claimed". Thus some tasks became high 
risk because of the cost pressures resulting in understaffing by agencies, whilst 
hosts had unrealistic expectations of the capacity of agency workers to adapt 
quickly to tasks to which their direct hire workers were already accustomed. 
Work intensification was raised frequently by focus group participants, 
especially those performing repetitive low skilled tasks such as in call centres and 
warehousing. One agency storeperson contrasted his experience with that of 
host employees: 
When there's clocks on you and you're timed on a lot of things, you always run the risk 
of accidents happening more so than if you didn't have the clock on. The clock is on 
the agency people even more, you can just see the permanents work slower, because 
they know they've got a job .... We've had agency guys pass out, working hard ... 
was stifling hot up there (level 3, warehouse) ... they were under the impression they 
wouldn't get hours, so they went flogging themselves then they passed out. 
Likewise, the allocation of higher risk tasks to agency workers was recognized 
as 'part-and-parcel' of being an agency worker. According to the focus group 
participants, it arose from both organizational decisions to outsource high risk 
tasks, and from host supervisors and employees managing work organization to 
favour permanent employees. A focus group of outdoor council agency workers 
described how host employees passed on the worst jobs to the agency workers: 
"When I first started working for (the agency) I was the one who had to walk 
over the piles of rubbish ... Doing the mowing up the hiii ... Collecting stones from 
up the hill compared to on flat grounds". Such practices not only placed agency 
workers at greater risk, but reinforced their perception of being second class 
workplace citizens. 
Together, the two sources of data illustrate the PDR model's contention 
that economic and reward pressures produce multiple risk factors which are 
experienced more acutely by agency workers. This disadvantage is compounded 
by disorganization characteristics discussed in the next section. 
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Disorganization at the Workplace 
Disorganization, the second category of risks in the PDR model, encompasses a 
range of characteristics which emerge in organizations that lack a commitment 
to a stable workforce (see Table 1 ). Most factors associated with disorganization 
could not be measured quantitatively from the data sets in this study. The analysis 
thus draws primarily upon qualitative data. 
The demographic characteristics of the injured agency workers in the 
workers' compensation f iles were consistent with those identified by Quinlan 
and Bohle (2004) as indicative of disorganization. One-third had either no prior 
work experience or experience unrelated to their placement (compared to 
only 8% of direct hire workers) and, as noted earlier, their employment tenure 
was significantly shorter. Consistent with their temporary status, they also had 
significantly less experience at the workplace where they were injured compared 
to direct hire workers (an average of 8.7 compared to 62.6 months). Experience 
can also be related to age. One quarter of agency workers were young (less than 
25 years old), compared to only 11% of injured direct hire workers. However, 
they were not the group most vulnerable to injury early in a placement. Older 
agency workers, aged 25-34 years, were more vulnerable, injured on average 3.39 
months into a placement compared to 5.26 months for the younger workers. In 
contrast, direct hire workers exhibited the more established relationship between 
age and injury, with younger workers injured on average at 29.66 months tenure 
compared to 35.15 months for the 25-34 year age group (as all workers in this 
dataset were injured, incidence of injury by age cannot be measured).1 lack of 
familiarity with host tasks appeared to increase the risk of injury more than the 
absence of broader experience (see Bresl in and Smith, 2006). Important was the 
potential for a mismatch between agency workers' skills and work capacity, and 
hosts' placement needs. 
Mismatching agency workers' capabilities to placement requirements took 
two forms. The first concerned workers' physical capabilities to perform host 
tasks. Thus, former white collar and long term unemployed workers were 
allocated labouring placements to which they were physically unsuited. In one 
workers' compensation case, "a small, rather overweight man with very poor 
muscles" (medical report) reported an injury to his upper limbs three days into 
a placement. The medical report continued " ... his very diffuse symptoms can 
only be accounted for by muscular soreness due to unaccustomed activity for 
three days, having previously done no physical work at all for several months". 
The second form of mismatch involved inadequate worker qualifications and 
experience for the placement. This was especially evident amongst trade workers 
placed to perform tasks which required more specialized or different skills. One 
worker's compensation case concerned a motor mechanic who crushed several 
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f ingers whilst repairing a tractor on the first day of placement in a council 
workshop. A host employee commented that "as a general motor mechanic 
involved in servicing ordinary motor cars, he would not have had any exposure 
to such heavy duty equipment". Focus group participants offered further insights 
into this risk. A construction industry union official described how under-qualified 
and poorly placed workers posed risks to both themselves, and host employees: 
Our blokes have got to refuse to work with these people because they're just downright 
dangerous, they haven't had the experience, they're sent out there, they've never seen 
a 100 tonne mobile crane before, they're spellbound when they see the damn thing, 
they've got a ticket for an overhead crane in a factory and they haven't a got clue how 
to do it ... 
Injuries associated with mismatched skills, by their nature, tended to occur early 
in a placement especially when some agencies placed workers without position 
descriptions from hosts or placed newly hired workers quickly without seeking 
documentation of prior experience. None of the injured di rect hire workers' data 
revealed injuries associated with this risk factor. 
The second disorganization risk factor concerned poor induction, training and 
supervision. However a substantial number of workers' compensation claims 
f iles (for agency and direct hire workers) did not clarify whether claimants had 
received training, reflecting the claims investigators' objective of establ ishing 
the existence of a work-related injury rather than investigating injury causation. 
Also, to the extent that the question was raised, it was only in the context of 
events immediately preceding the injury. Amongst injured agency workers, 16% 
and 20% were known to have received induction f rom the agency and host 
respectively, but such data were missing from 59% of the files. 
Qualitative data on training were more revealing, showing a variety of 
deficiencies. In some instances host training was not comprehensive enough. In 
one worker's compensation case, a distribution centre packer received on-the-
job training from the host on the first day of his placement, but was injured the 
next when a motorized trol ley jack ran over his foot. He claimed "At no stage 
had I been given any advice on possible dangers or working capabil ity of the 
pallet jack by [the host)" . In another such case, the host provided an extensive 
but standard induction training designed for direct hire workers; much of the 
content (such as social club activit ies and company long-term objectives) was 
irrelevant to the needs and interests of agency workers. In yet other cases, hosts 
provided training for workplace specific but not general OHS risks such as manual 
handling, incorrectly assuming the agency had already provided this. Hosts too 
often appeared to assume that casual observation of others, and 'common sense' 
could replace training. 
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One focus group agency worker in manufacturing who had been employed 
by the host prior to maintenance being outsourced seven years earlier described 
how "Before my job was outsourced I regularly participated in training ... since 
then I've had one short training course, in seven years". Focus group agency 
workers believed the absence of training reflected their employers' prioritization 
of cost minimization. They also believed agencies preferred to place less skilled, 
lower paid workers over more experienced, better qualified workers. 
Poor training coupled with inexperience, unfamiliarity, and mismatched 
placements increased the need for effective communication to enable agency 
workers to perform tasks safely during a placement. Yet fractured communication, 
manifested in communication breakdowns between agency workers, the agency, 
and the host, appeared widespread. Most common was the inability of agency 
workers to get either party to respond to OHS concerns, both arguing that it was 
the other party's responsibil ity. A focus group warehouse storeperson expressed 
frustration and a sense of powerlessness with the refusal of employers and hosts 
to respond to OHS concerns: 
We always get the ping-pong ball. .. the labour hire (agency) company says it was the 
host's decision, the host says it's got nothing to do with us ... 
In some instances, agency workers believed this contributed to the severity 
of their injury as they continued to work whilst injured, awaiting a response 
from either party. These problems were not evident amongst direct hire injured 
workers; responsibility for OHS lay clearly with their employer without a third 
party upon whom blame could be placed. 
Another aspect of fractured communication, which also appeared unique to 
agency workers, was the lack of social support (extending to antagonism) from 
host employees which contributed to agency workers' sense of isolation whilst also 
potentially complicating their access to workers' compensation payments. Some 
agency workers, for example, could not recall the names of co-workers when 
asked who witnessed their injury, weakening the legitimacy of their claim and 
delaying entitlement to compensation. In other cases, host employees questioned 
the legitimacy of claims by agency workers, a practice not evident in the direct 
hire injured workers' files. In one worker's compensation case, an agency worker 
lodged a claim for stress after three weeks of what she described as belittling 
behaviour by host employees towards her, including continually referring to her 
as "the temp" rather than by name, and giving her an unreasonable workload. 
The latter, she believed, was because host employees incorrectly thought she 
received AUD$25 per hour, not the lesser AUD$1 5.50 per hour the agency paid 
her. None of the casual direct hire injured workers, who may also be considered 
'outsiders' relative to permanent workers, reported encountering the persistent 
communication breakdowns experienced by injured agency workers. 
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The final component of disorganization identified by Quinlan and Bohle (2004) 
is ineffective OHS management systems and the inability of workers to collectively 
organize. Two common manifestations were agency workers' lack of knowledge 
of the host's OHS system requirements, especially the need to report injuries, and 
their explicit exclusion from such reporting systems. Some hosts only learnt of 
an agency worker's injury once a workers' compensation claim had been lodged 
with the agency. Consequently, hosts had limited records upon which to develop 
preventative measures, and injured workers' compensation claims were delayed 
because hosts could not confirm the incident. The exclusion of agency workers 
from hosts' OHS systems also resulted in exposure to risks not encountered by 
host employees. One worker's compensation case concerned an agency forkl ift 
driver who was injured when he slipped on grease on the step of a forklift. The 
host's systems required that "Each driver is responsible for the ongoing cleanliness 
on a daily basis of any fork he is using. While permanent employees of the 
company use the same forklift each day, casuals can swap and change from one 
fork to another during the course of the day depending on the type of work 
being undertaken ... " (investigator's report). A manufacturing focus group agency 
worker described how segregation in OHS management could increase risk: 
We argued for 6 months to get ventilated safety masks ... the host eventually supplied 
them to the (direct hire) production workers, but still refused to supply them to us. 
Whilst systematic approaches may be taken to preventative housekeeping 
amongst host workers, these examples show they may not be extended to 
agency workers. 
Such exclusion is compounded by lack of collective voice. A manufacturing 
focus group worker reported losing capacity to voice concerns because of fear of 
black listing, coupled with acute employment insecurity: 
You're not about to whack your hand up in a hurry because you get targeted ... Word 
spreads quickly amongst the [agency] f irms and then the worker is offered no further 
work. 
Disorganization characterized many aspects of agency work. It was most 
pronounced early in a placement when mismatched placements and poor t raining 
heightened the risk of injury, reflected in the timing of injuries experienced by 
the injured agency workers. Eighteen percent of agency worker claimants were 
injured during the first week of their placement; 35% within the first month. By 
contrast, only 5% of direct hire workers were injured during their f irst month 
of employment. Over time, different manifestations of disorganization exposed 
agency workers to a higher risk of injury, particularly fractured communication, 
segregated OHS management systems, and barriers to organized expression of 
workplace grievances. 
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Regulatory Failure: Regulatory Context and Agency Workers' 
Vulnerability 
The PDR model identifies four elements of regulatory failure: lack of knowledge 
of legal rights/obligations; limited access to those rights; disputed legal obliga-
tions; and non-compliance coupled with regulator oversight The injured work-
ers' data offered few insights into worker knowledge of entitlements, whilst the 
focus groups were composed primarily of union members aware, perhaps un-
typically, of their rights. The discussion which follows thus disregards the first 
risk factor, focusing instead upon the other three. It will be seen that there is 
substantial overlap between regulatory failure and the other components of the 
PDR model. Many of the risk factors and outcomes discussed above result from, 
or contribute to, regulatory failure. 
First, evidence from the workers' compensation files suggested agency 
workers were constrained because most were employed as casuals with minimal 
protection f rom arbitrary dismissal. Both agency employers and hosts could easily 
assert no further placements to workers perceived as troublemakers, or those 
who lodged workers' compensation claims. Fear of job loss constrained agency 
workers from reporting injuries, taking t ime off to recover, or exercising their 
right to voice concerns about OHS risks. These constraints were not evident in 
the comparable data on directly hired casual and permanent injured workers. 
Agency workers' fear of asserting rights was also evident in their attitudes to 
union membership and representation. Focus group evidence revealed fear of 
discrimination -typically dismissal - for being a union member or seeking union 
support. A union official (focus group participant) described how requests for 
union assistance often hinged upon anonymity: 
We get our phone calls from [agency) employees after hours ... a lot don't even want the 
company to know they are union members ... when you go out there they specifically 
say to you "Don't mention my name ... 
Reluctance, extending to unwillingness to call upon union support underpins 
other risk factors in the PDR model. 
Another element of regulatory failure concerns non-compliance and 
enforcement problems. Important here is the right to OHS worker representation. 
Focus group participants repeatedly raised concerns about the threat to 
employment associated with becoming an OHS representative: 
That's why we haven't got many OHS reps, just as we haven't got many [shop) stewards 
- the minute you raise an issue, they move you out ... 
Unions have traditionally played an important role in day-to-day enforcement 
of workers' rights in Australia. Union officials participating in the focus groups 
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explained how that role was constrained by the expansion of agency work. One 
aspect of this concerned worker anonymity caused by high turnover amongst 
agency workers. According to one shop steward: 
Down in the yard I used to know every job that was vacant, I could tell who was 
casual. .. who was st ill off for Work cover, sick leave, annual leave ... but I couldn't give 
you any idea now because of just the sheer numbers of labour hire workers ... 
A further risk factor concerns the potential for legal obligations to be disputed 
when the responsibility for OHS lies with more than one party. Both the agency 
employer and host typically have responsibility for providing agency workers with 
a safe and healthy workplace. This includes ensuring workers have the skil ls and 
knowledge to work safely, and that hazards are identified and controlled before 
placements commence. Agency employers must ensure hosts have undertaken 
preventative actions such as risk assessments, and monitor the health and safety 
of workers at the host workplace (Underhill, 2008). The injured workers' data 
revealed the deficiencies in training by agency employers and hosts, whilst focus 
group participants reported that often neither party fulfilled their obligations. 
OHS problems continued unabated whilst agency employers and hosts 'passed 
the buck' between one other. 
Regulatory failure was common across the agency sector. Whilst the first 
of the risk factors could not be reliably assessed from available data, the other 
risk factors were evident amongst agency workers in this study. The concluding 
discussion draws together these findings and highl ights those factors which 
distinguish the agency employment and OHS experience from that experienced 
by other precarious employees. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper aimed to explore the explanatory value of the PDR model in the con-
text of temporary agency work. Qual itative data from the injured workers' claim 
f iles and focus groups offered unique insights into the experience of temporary 
agency workers. From this, it is clear that the risks they face are broadly consis-
tent with those identified in the PDR model. Some of these risks are common to 
other forms of precarious employment (as would be expected, given the origins 
of the PDR model); others are peculiar to agency employment because of the 
triangular employment relationship which distinguishes their employment from 
direct hire employment. The discussion which follows focuses upon those char-
acteristics which are shaped by the interrelationship between temporary agency 
operations, host employers, and temporary agency workers and which accentu-
ate or produce new risks. The PDR model helps explain why temporary agency 
workers experience poorer OHS outcomes than direct hire employees because it 
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draws out key characteristics of their employment and the regulatory environ-
ment which impact upon health and safety. 
First, economic and reward pressures are especially pervasive in temporary 
agency work because of the reliance by temporary agency employers upon 
casual workers. Agency employers claim it is only economically viable to hire 
workers when there is a placement available with a host, and that requires 
unfettered access to a casual workforce (Underhill and Quinlan, 201 0). For 
agency workers, this results in prolonged uncertainty over when and where 
they next work. There are no regulatory constraints upon agencies using casual 
employees in this way. Nor are there legal constraints upon direct hire employers 
hiring casuals in the same manner. However, the capacity of agency employers 
to effectively dismiss workers who report an injury or take time off to recover 
from a minor injury, or circumvent protection against discrimination (such as 
for being a union member or raising a grievance), by claiming no further host 
placements were available, contributed to agency workers' acute sense of 
insecurity. These pressu res were perceived by agency workers as contributing 
to their greater risk of injury, and injury severity, through their need to work 
with injury (work and non-work related), and endure task overload and work 
intensification. 
Second, the risk factors associated with disorganization in the PDR model 
were demonstrated in the data, coupled with additional factors which appear 
specific to agency employment. The interactions between agency employers and 
hosts accentuated disorganization risks identified by Quinlan and Bohle (2004), 
and produced unique risks consistent with the concept of disorganization. Three 
risk factors were identified as either unique to or significantly compounded by 
the triangular employment relationship: mismatched placements; unfamiliarity 
with host workplaces and tasks; and communication barriers. 
Before discussing why these factors are especially pronounced amongst agency 
workers, it is necessary to briefly summarize key characteristics of the temporary 
agency work in Australia. Barriers to entry are low; capital requirements are 
minimal; and business licensing regulations, which might otherwise deter new 
entrants, do not exist (Parl iament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2005). 
Most agencies are small businesses, competing on price. Around the time 
data were collected for this study, 80% of agencies employed fewer than 1 0 
administrative employees (ABS, 2003); by 2009, the largest agency held only 
12% of the placement market (Hargrave and Janes, 2009). Although some 
agencies may differentiate themselves on the basis of an attribute other than 
price (such as occupational specialization), most large agencies are forced to 
compete with smaller operators on price, notwithstanding their greater capital 
costs (Underhill and Quinlan, 201 0). 
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Three OHS risks flow from these competitive pressures. First are mismatched 
placements. Agencies are compelled to place workers quickly or risk losing the 
host to another agency (Underhill and Quinlan, 201 0). This contributes to the 
mismatch between workers' skills, experience and capabilities, and hosts needs 
(see also Allen, Sompayrac and White, 2002). Poorly matched agency workers 
could be readily replaced by others; those injured because of the mismatch could 
be easily dismissed. These mismatched placements increased workers' risk of injury, 
whilst poor induction and OHS training precluded development of knowledge 
about safe work practices. Second are risks associated with exposure to unfamiliar 
workplaces. Hosts' expected that agencies placed workers immediately capable 
of performing the job and allowed workers no adjustment time nor task specific 
training. Unfamiliarity with the hosts' tasks and workplace risks left agency workers 
vulnerable to injuries early in a placement, notwithstanding any broader experience 
and knowledge. Third, as placements continued, fractured communication 
created additional risks. Agency workers' experience differed from that of direct 
hire workers because of this. They effectively had two masters - the agency and 
the host- neither willing to accept responsibility for OHS problems; they had to 
communicate with a party external to the workplace to resolve problems; and they 
were less likely to be integrated with co-workers sharing a common employer and 
common problems (Pocock, Prosser and Bridge, 2004). Importantly, protection 
from dismissal for raising grievances was less available. 
The third category of PDR risks is regulatory failure. As explained above, many 
of the risks associated with economic pressures and disorganization were based 
upon and compounded by regulatory failure. Non-compliance with statutory 
obligations appeared wide-spread. With such a predominance of small operators, 
regulatory failure may be attributed to lack of knowledge by agency employers, 
but a culture of non-compliance was also evident Focus group participants' 
concerns with non-compliance extended beyond OHS and employment security 
to basic rights such as receiving the minimum wage for all hours worked. This 
culture of non-compliance was arguably facilitated by the problems regulators 
faced in enforcing legal obligations across the agency industry. The smaller 
agency employers, with minimal fixed capital, easily close when threatened 
with prosecution, and re-open under another legal identity (Vickery, Interview, 
2008). Furthermore, limited resources of regulators result in a preference for 
'demonstration effect' prosecutions of large stable companies. Consequently 
smaller agencies operate without fear of prosecution, in the knowledge they 
can 'disappear' should an employee be sufficiently severely injured to warrant 
prosecution. Direct employers, in contrast, are more readily identifiable by 
regulators, have more capital and reputation to protect, and are unable to 
'disappear' when threatened with prosecution. Thus the risk of regulatory failure 
is less pervasive amongst large agencies and direct hire employers. 
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The evidence upon temporary agency workers lends support to the utility of 
the PDR model as a means of explaining the poorer OHS outcomes experienced 
by precarious workers. Additional risk factors were identified, but these are 
variations upon those identified by Quinlan and Bohle (2004) under the umbrella 
of disorganization. A strength of the PDR model, in fact, is the identification of 
the three sources of risk with which the particular attributes of specific forms of 
precarious employment can be identif ied and categorized. 
The data analyzed in this study suggest temporary agency workers experienced 
different and more acute risks than direct hire employees. However there are 
several qualifications to observe. First, the injured workers' data were limited to 
those workers' compensation claimants whose claims had been investigated by 
the insurance agent. Hence, those with acute injuries were under-represented 
in the sample. Also gaps in data collection by the insurance investigator 
precluded the isolation of variables which may be relevant but could not be 
identified. Second, focus group participants were predominantly blue-collar 
unionized agency workers (the exceptions being call centre workers) who were 
well-informed about, but largely dissatisfied with, agency employment. Other 
occupational groups with high levels of agency employment, such as nurses, may 
see the OHS risks of agency work quite differently (Underhill, 2005). Likewise, the 
extent to which the experience of these agency workers with respect to issues 
such as discrimination and lack of workplace voice is shared by other workers 
could not be assessed. Notwithstanding these qualifications, the data in this 
study provide insight into the OHS experience of agency workers renowned for 
their inaccessibil ity to researchers; indicates risk factors unique to this form of 
employment; and suggests avenues for further research. 
Notes 
1 Analysis of variance and post-hoc tests using the Bonerroni test were applied and statistically 
significant differences were identified between the youngest agency workers and those aged 
over 55 years (p < .01); and between those aged 25-34 and all older workers except those 
aged 35-44 years (p < .05); for direct hire workers, statistically significant difference were 
found between those aged 15-24 years and those over 45 years (p < .01 ); and 25-34 year 
olds compared to those over 45 years (p < .01 ). 
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SUMMARY 
How Precarious Employment Affects Health and Safety 
at Work: The Case of Temporary Agency Workers 
Precarious employment has been associated with adverse occupationa l health and 
safety (OHS) outcomes across a range of studies. Temporary agency workers are 
particularly vulnerable, with studies showing they experience a higher incidence 
of workplace injury, and a greater likelihood of more severe injuries than all other 
employment types. Explanations for agency workers' h igher risk of injury have, 
to date, been impeded by data limitations associated w ith researching temporary 
employment. This article seeks to begin fi l l ing this gap through analyzing the 
experience of agency workers based upon two data sources. The first is a unique 
qualitative and quantitative data set developed from investigated temporary 
agency and directly hired workers' compensation fi les; the second is focus groups 
of agency workers conducted in the State of Victor ia, Australia. Quinlan and 
Bohle's (2004) Pressures, Disorganization and Regulatory Fail ure (PDR) model, 
developed to explain the greater OHS vulnerability of precarious workers, provides 
the framework for analyzing the data. 
After explaining the key concepts in the PDR Model, the article analyses the data 
to test for evidence of economic pressures, d isorganization at the workplace, 
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and regulatory failure impacting upon temporary agency workers' health and 
safety. The analysis supports the relevance of the PDR model, and provides an 
understanding of additional and unique risk factors which contribute to agency 
workers' higher risk of injury. Temporary agency workers experience economic 
pressures in common with other types of precarious workers. However, these 
appear more acute amongst agency workers. They also confront disorganization 
risks, extending to mismatched placements; lack offamiliarity w ith host workplaces; 
and more complex fractured communication. These contribute to workplace risks 
and create barriers to improving their experience. Many of these outcomes are a 
result of, or contribute to regulatory failure. 
The analysis finds strong support for the explanatory value of the PDR model as 
a tool for understanding how precariousness contributes to temporary agency 
workers' adverse health and safety outcomes. It also suggests the complexities 
of the triangular employment relationship create additional economic insecurities 
and d isorganization problems beyond those experienced by other types of workers, 
which the regulatory environment has yet to address. 
KEYWORDS: precarious employment. temporary agency work, occupational health 
and safety 
RESUME 
L'influence de l'emploi precaire sur Ia sante et Ia securite au 
travai l : evidences tirees d'une etude aupres de travailleurs 
d'agences de placement temporaire 
L'emplo i precaire a ete associe au travers de diverses etudes a des effets negatifs 
en matiere de sante et securite au travai l (SST). Les travailleurs d'agences de pla-
cement temporaire seraient particulierement vulnerables, des etudes rapportant a 
leur egard une plus grande incidence de blessures en milieu de travail ainsi qu' une 
plus grande probabilite de subir des blessures severes comparativement a tout 
autres types d'emplois. Les explications du risque de blessures plus eleve chez ces 
travailleurs ont, a ce jour, ete entravees par des limites de donnees associees a Ia 
recherche sur l 'emploi temporaire. Cet article cherche a combler cette lacune en 
analysant !'experience de travai lleurs d'agences de placement a partir de deux 
sources de donnees. La premiere est un ensemble de donnees qualitatives et quan-
t itatives un ique developpe a partir d'une enquete aupres de telles agences et de 
f iches de paie de travai lleurs directement embauches; Ia seconde est constituee 
de groupes de discussion de travailleurs d'agences de placement temporaire me-
nes dans l'etat de Victoria en Australie. Le modele de Quinlan et Bohle (2004) « 
pressions, desorganisation et echec de Ia reglementation » (ou PDR pour « Pressu-
res, Disorganization and Regulatory Failure »), developpe pour expliquer Ia plus 
grande vulnerabilite des travai lleurs precaires en SST, fournit le cadre d'analyse 
des donnees. 
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Apres avoir explique les concepts des du modele PDR, cet article analyse les don-
nees pour tester Ia presence de l'impact des pressions economiques, de Ia desor-
ganisation en milieu de travai l et de l'echec de Ia reglementation sur Ia sante et Ia 
securite des travailleurs d'agences de placement temporaire. L'analyses confirme 
I' adequation du modele PDR et produit une comprehension de facteurs addition-
nels et uniques qui contribuent au risque plus eleve de blessure des ces travailleurs. 
Bien que ces derniers vivent des pressions economiques comme c'est le cas pour 
d'autres types de travai lleurs precaires, ces pressions semblent plus aigues parmi 
les travailleurs d'agences de placement temporaire. lis doivent egalement affron-
ter des risques de desorganisation dont des placements inadequats, un manque de 
familiarisation avec leurs milieux de travail d'accueil, et des communications plus 
complexes fracturees. Ces elements contribuent aux risques en milieu de travai l et 
creent des barrieres a I' amelioration de leur experience de travail. Plusieurs de ces 
situations sont un resultat de, et contribuent a, l'echec de Ia reglementat ion. 
Cette etude constitue un appui important a Ia valeur explicative du modele PDR 
comme outil pour com prendre comment Ia precarite contribue a Ia degradation de 
Ia SST des travailleurs d'agences de placement temporaire. Elle suggere egalement 
que Ia complexite de Ia relation d'emploi triangulaire de ces travailleurs cree de 
l'insecurite economique additionnelle et des problemes de desorganisation au-
dela de ceux vecus par d'autres types de travailleurs, ce a quoi Ia reglementation 
ne s'est pas encore adressee. 
MOTS CLES : emploi precaire, agence de placement temporaire, sante et securite au 
travail 
RESUMEN 
Como el empleo precario afecta Ia seguridad y salud ocupa-
cional : evidencia a partir de un estudio sobre los trabajadores 
temporaries de agencia 
El empleo precario ha sido asociado a resultados negatives de seguridad y salud 
ocupacional (SSO) por una gama de estudios. Los estudios muestran que los tra-
bajadores temporaries de agencia son particularmente vulnerables y que ellos ex-
perimentan una alta incidencia de lesiones ocupacionales y una probabilidad mas 
elevada de lesiones graves comparados a todos los otros tipos de trabajadores. 
Las explicaciones del alto riesgo de lesion de los trabajadores de agenda han sido 
obstaculizadas por las limitaciones de los datos asociados a las investigaciones so-
bre el empleo temporario. Este articulo pretende contribuir a colmar este vacio 
mediante el anal isis de Ia experiencia de los trabajadores de agencia basado en dos 
fuentes de datos. Se trata en primer Iugar de un conjunto de datos cualitativos y 
cuantitativos unicos desarrollados por Ia agencia temporaria estudiada a partir de 
los datos de compensaci6n de los trabajadores contratados; el segundo grupo de 
datos proviene de entrevistas de grupo con trabajadores de agencias en el estado 
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de Victoria, Australia. El modelo Presiones, Desorganizaci6n y fa lta de Regulaci6n 
(PDR), desarrollado por Quinlan y Bohle (2004) para explicar Ia mas grande vulne-
rabi lidad en cuanto a Ia seguridad y salud ocupacional de los trabajadores preca-
rios, constituye el marco para analizar estos datos. 
Despues de explicar los conceptos claves del modelo PDR, el articulo analiza los 
datos para eva luar Ia evidencia de presiones econ6micas, Ia desorganizaci6n en 
el Iugar de trabajo y Ia ausencia de regulaci6n que impactan sobre Ia seguridad y 
salud ocupadona l de los trabajadores temporaries de agendas. El anal isis sustenta 
Ia pertinencia del modelo PDR y procura una comprensi6n de los facto res de riesgo 
adicionales y unicos que contribuyen al r iesgo mas elevado de lesiones de los 
trabajadores de agendas. Los trabajadores temporaries de agendas experimentan 
presiones econ6micas comunes a los otros trabajadores precarios, sin embargo estas 
presiones aparecen mas agudas en el caso de los trabajadores de agencias. Ellos 
confrontan tambien los riesgos de desorgan izaci6n, incluyendo colocaciones mal 
emparejadas; Ia ausencia de fami liaridad con los lugares de trabajo huespedes, y 
las complejas comunicaciones fracturadas. Esto contribuye a los riesgos en el lugar 
de trabajo y crea barreras para mejorar sus experiencias. Muchos de estos efectos 
son un resultado de Ia fa lta de regulaci6n o contribuye a dicha fa lta. 
El anal isis ofrece un fuerte apoyo al valor explicative del modelo PDR como instru-
mento para comprender como Ia precariedad contribuye a los resultados adversos 
en seguridad y salud ocupacional de los trabajadores temporaries de agencies. 
Tambien se sugiere que las complej idades de Ia relaci6n de empleo triangular 
crean inseguridades econ6micas y problemas de desorganizaci6n adidonales mas 
alia de lo que experimentan otros tipos de trabajadores, cuyos ambientes de regu-
laci6n dejan tambien a desear. 
PALABRAS CLAVES: empleo precario, trabajo temporario de agencia, salud e higiene 
ocupacional 
